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We can properly call a number of nudges libertarian nudges, but the ter-
ritory of libertarian nudging is smaller than is often realized.  The domain of 
libertarian nudges is populated by choice-independent nudges, or nudges that 
only assist the decision process and do not push choosers toward any particu-
lar choice.  Some choice-dependent nudges pose no great concern from a lib-
ertarian perspective for rational choosers so long as there is a low-cost way to 
avoid the nudger’s favored choice.  However, choice-dependent nudges will 
interfere with the autonomy of irrational choosers, because the opt-out option 
will be meaningless for this group.  Choice-independent nudges should be of 
no concern with respect to irrational actors and in fact should be welcomed 
because they can promote the decision competence fundamental to libertari-
anism, but choice-dependent nudges can never truly be libertarian nudges. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Libertarian paternalism gave birth to the nudge.1  Under the philosophy 
of libertarian paternalism, a person in power seeks to create policies that steer 
people toward outcomes that should promote their welfare but also allow peo-
ple “to go their own way.”2  The classic example of libertarian paternalism is 
an employee pension plan in which the employer sets the default to automatic 
enrollment with automatic annual contributions for all employees.3  Under this 
plan, employees predisposed to accept the default option, due to motivational 
or cognitive inertia, will be sure to accrue some retirement savings, but those 
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 1. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
 2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 
583, 583 (2014).  The person in power may be in a private or public institution.  All 
one needs to be a libertarian paternalist is some power over the behavior of others and 
a desire to use that power in accordance with the dictates of the philosophy.  Thus, the 
head of a school cafeteria who chooses to arrange foods on a serving line or buffet in a 
way that promotes healthy eating would be a libertarian paternalist.  See RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1–3 (2008) (using the cafeteria example to introduce the idea 
of nudging). 
 3. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1172–73. 
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who want to spend time deliberating over their options can choose an alterna-
tive course.  The libertarian paternalist planner does engage in some paternal-
istic judgments when designing the policy, but those judgments are not bind-
ing; the final choice ultimately resides with those who must live under the pol-
icy.4  Hence, under libertarian paternalism, the central planner “nudges” in a 
helpful direction rather than compels or restricts choices.5 
The nudge, however, has outgrown its libertarian paternalist origins and 
now encompasses any policy that does not directly involve mandates, bans, 
rewards, or penalties.6  Under this broader conception of nudging, there is no 
requirement that the nudge seek to promote the interests of those directly af-
fected by the policy nor that those affected by the policy have any choice in the 
matter.  Thus, we find attempts to push people toward other-regarding choices 
through the manipulation of charitable solicitation forms,7 as well as placing 
restrictions on the number of pills that can be dispensed to reduce the risk of 
intentional overdose,8 both being labeled nudges.  Even policies that involve 
direct payments to encourage desired behaviors have been described as 
nudges.9  A cynic might contend that the nudge label is sometimes used oppor-
tunistically, as cover for run-of-the-mill paternalism. 
With the proliferation of so many different nudges, with so many different 
justifications and implications for welfare and freedom of choice, it is a good 
time to return to the origins of nudging and ask whether any nudges can really 
 
 4. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 584. 
 5. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5–6 (explaining how the nudge is 
related to libertarian paternalism). 
 6. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges, Agency, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics, 
6 REV. PHIL. & PSYCH. 511, 513 (2015) (“Whenever a government has offices, designs 
highways, or maintains a court system and official websites, it will nudge.”).  One is 
tempted to equate nudging with “choice architecture,” see Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. 
Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 428, 428 (Eldar Shafir ed. 2012), but some things called nudges by Sun-
stein, Thaler, and others seem to have little to do with the way in which choice situa-
tions are constructed. 
 7. See Indranil Goswami & Oleg Urminsky, When Should the Ask Be a Nudge? 
The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations, 53 J. MARKETING RES. 829, 
838–39 (2016); see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1185.  Originally, Sunstein 
and Thaler distinguished interventions such as this, which are other-regarding, from 
interventions that are self-regarding.  The former were deemed examples of libertarian 
benevolence and the latter examples of libertarian paternalism.  See id. at 1162 (“[T]he 
notion of libertarian paternalism can be complemented by that of libertarian benevo-
lence, by which plan design features such as default rules, framing effects, and starting 
points are enlisted in the interest of vulnerable third parties.”). 
 8. See DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT: HOW SMALL CHANGES CAN 
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 77 (2015). 
 9. See HALPERN, supra note 8, at 96 (proposing the use of lottery entries based 
on date of filing to incentivize earlier tax filings); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, 
at 234 (including in their lists of nudges a program under which teenage girls receive a 
dollar for each day they are not pregnant). 
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fulfill libertarian paternalism’s promise of promoting individual interests with-
out infringing impermissibly on personal liberty.10  I argue that a number of 
interventions now placed under the label nudge can in fact be fairly described 
as libertarian nudges.11  In particular, libertarians should welcome nudges that 
seek to promote rational choice without favoring any particular choice.12 
Nudges that fit the definition of truly libertarian nudges are what we might 
call instances of choice-independent nudging: when a “choice architect”13 
seeks to provide information, make the decision-making process less difficult, 
or make one’s choice easier to implement, then the design is choice independ-
ent.  So long as these designs are implemented in ways that may improve de-
cision-making competence in general or the rationality of a particular decision, 
while remaining agnostic about what choice should be made, there is no reason 
 
 10. Although philosophers often distinguish liberty, personal autonomy, and free-
dom of choice, these terms are used more loosely here to refer to the basic idea that 
individuals should be free to determine how they want to live to the greatest extent 
possible within a society of equals.  This idea is meant to capture the basic proposition 
of libertarianism that individuals are self-owners who cannot be treated as interchange-
able objects.  Thus, each individual has the right to control what she does and nothing 
can be done to or for the individual without her consent, which implies the right to be 
free of (most) government intrusions regardless of the intent behind the intrusion.  See 
generally Peter Vallentyne & Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/.  A con-
sumer sovereignty perspective, borne out of skepticism about the ability of policy de-
signers to decide what is best for consumers, or a public choice perspective that worries 
about nudger corruption and industry capture, could lead to similar conclusions.  See, 
e.g., Brian F. Mannix & Susan Dudley, The Limits of Irrationality as a Rationale for 
Regulation, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 705 (2015).  The libertarian trope, which 
was originally chosen by Sunstein and Thaler, primarily serves as a mechanism for 
focusing on when nudges should be seen as promoting individual rationality and self-
determination versus imposing some external conception of welfare or good judgment 
on the person affected by the policy.  The motivation here is empirical rather than po-
litical: are there some forms of choice architecture that can promote rational choice and 
that therefore avoid imposing strong assumptions about who commits what decision-
making errors when?  Answering this question should be useful regardless of one’s 
political philosophy. 
 11. My initial discussion of libertarian paternalism recognized this possibility but 
did not give it extended treatment.  See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1248, 1248 n.10, 1260–69 (2005).  For two 
alternative approaches to reconciling nudging with libertarianism, see Chris Mills, The 
Heteronomy of Choice Architecture, 6 REV. PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 495, 502–04 (2015) and 
T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341, 353–54 (2013). 
 12. Anyone who has consequentialist reasons for infringing freedom of choice or 
who believes that some value other than personal freedom should take priority should 
have no general gripe against nudging, for it is just another tool in the regulator’s 
toolbox.  For consequentialists, the question should be whether a particular nudge is a 
better way to achieve the desired consequences than alternative regulatory approaches. 
 13. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3 (“A choice architect has the re-
sponsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions.”). 
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to object.  The motivation behind the intervention need not be paternalistic: 
market forces may demand more information or the availability of commitment 
devices.  In any event, given the lack of steering, the motivation behind the 
intervention should be irrelevant.  Furthermore, even covert choice-independ-
ent nudging presents no special libertarian concerns so long as the effect is to 
encourage deliberation rather than favor a particular outcome.14 
In contrast, many nudges do seek to steer choosers in particular direc-
tions.15  These choice-dependent nudges increase the difficulty or cost of 
choosing one option over another, seek to take advantage of the cognitive or 
motivational biases of choosers to favor one choice over another, or may even 
seek to change preferences in a particular direction.16  A choice-dependent 
nudge could still be acceptable to the libertarian if the nudge allows an easy 
way out of the choice that has been favored by the choice architect.17  However, 
as we will see, this libertarian work-around will be meaningless for people who 
do not have the cognitive or motivational resources needed to overcome the 
nudge.18  For these people, the nudger effectively makes the choice.  Therefore, 
choice-dependent nudges cannot ever be truly libertarian nudges. 
We can properly call a number of nudges libertarian nudges, but the do-
main of libertarian nudging is smaller than is often realized.  This domain is 
populated by choice-independent nudges, but a number of choice-dependent 
nudges pose no great concern from a libertarian perspective with respect to 
rational choosers where there is an easy opt-out (e.g., this will often be the 
case with nudges that steer through default setting).  Choice-dependent nudges 
will interfere with the autonomy of irrational choosers, however, because the 
opt-out will be meaningless for this group.  Thus, most nudges, whether choice-
independent or choice-dependent, should be of no concern with respect to ra-
tional actors, at least not if they do provide an easy opt-out.  Choice-independ-
ent nudges should be of no concern with respect to irrational actors and in fact 
should be welcomed, but choice-dependent nudges can never be libertarian 
nudges with respect to irrational actors. 
 
 14. For instance, informing decision-makers that they will be asked to explain 
their decisions encourages rational deliberation, and this effect can be obtained simply 
by the prospect of being held accountable to another.  See generally Jennifer S. Lerner 
& Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
255 (1999).  Thus, even insincere accountability threats can improve the quality of de-
cision-making.  So long as the nudge is aimed at promoting a careful choice that the 
individual deems best for herself, without favoring any particular choice, the individual 
remains the owner of the self and the nudge arguably promotes self-ownership.   How-
ever, were the accountability manipulation used to favor a particular outcome, say, by 
telling an employee she would be held accountable to a boss known to favor certain 
outcomes, then the nudgee’s choices are being manipulated. 
 15. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 583. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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After a fuller exposition of the argument, this Article concludes by con-
sidering whether efforts to improve decision-making competence can be rec-
onciled with libertarianism’s strong opposition to paternalistic measures.19  I 
argue that choice-independent nudges can satisfy the libertarian requirement 
that the government not interfere with private exchanges except to rectify co-
ercive transactions.  Specifically, because choice-independent nudges seek to 
further no policy other than promoting self-ownership through competent de-
cision-making and because some irrational consumers may be unfairly ex-
ploited by private actors, one can justify the use of choice-independent nudges 
on grounds of preventing this exploitation. 
II. LIBERTARIAN NUDGING 
We can formulate two alternative routes for nudges to avoid treading on 
the personal autonomy that libertarians prize.  First, if an intervention is de-
signed to help the chooser make the choice that would be made absent mistakes 
or irrational influences, then the intervention has promoted rather than impeded 
self-ownership, with self-ownership being one of the primary rights under lib-
ertarianism.20 
As James Child discusses, implicit in libertarian conceptions of self-own-
ership is the idea that citizens possess a “general competence” or “have suffi-
cient capacities to engage in practical reasoning and to be moral agents.”21  
“General competence” as used by Child is synonymous with the capacity for 
rational choice: 
By relying on much recent work on the notion of general competence 
and the related notion of a capacity for autonomy, we can formulate the 
constituents of the competence to enter market transactions.  They 
would include the following deliberative capacities: (1) to acquire, un-
derstand and appraise information, which includes considering its prob-
ability of truth or falsity and its relevance; (2) to entertain a stable set 
of preferences by which choice among various options with various 
payoffs can be made; and (3) in light of this information and these val-
ues, to consider choices and weigh the possible risks, costs, and benefits 
of those choices.  This includes the risk and cost of acting on false in-
 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. I follow Child in designating self-ownership and private ownership of property 
as the most basic rights under a libertarian philosophy, with the right to defend oneself 
and one’s property from takings or attacks being second-order rights.  James W. Child, 
Can Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard?, 104 ETHICS 722, 725–28 (1994).  The 
right to own property arguably flows from the self-ownership right, at least to the extent 
one needs property to achieve one’s goals.  See id. at 726.  Or rather, it is difficult to 
think of property rights as independent of the right to self-determination. 
 21. Id. at 729. 
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formation.  These would be combined with the broadly volitional ca-
pacities to arrive at decisions on the basis of those deliberations and act 
in accord with those decisions.22 
Given the importance of rational choice to self-ownership, if nudges pro-
mote rational choice without controlling how that choice is exercised, then 
nudges promote self-ownership.23  One may still worry that an intervention that 
promotes rational choice involves some slight interference with self-determi-
nation,24 but the most serious objection that someone else’s reasoning and pref-
erences have determined the choice (i.e., that the policy is paternalistic) will be 
met.  As we will see, a number of nudges take this route and thus should not 
worry libertarians. 
A second route to defending nudges from libertarian attack, and the route 
that Sunstein and Thaler favor, is to create interventions in ways that allow the 
chooser to opt out at little or no cost.25  If an intervention allows choosers easily 
and inexpensively to avoid the choice preferred by someone else, then the in-
tervention should not be seen as a serious intrusion on personal autonomy, es-
pecially because it is inevitable that choice situations will be set up in a way 
that favors some course of action over another.26  Given the inevitability of 
specifying a starting point and the possible influence that starting point might 
have, why not frame policies in ways that promote the chooser’s best inter-
ests?27  So long as choosers can go their own way, no one’s freedom has been 
taken away.28  Or so the argument goes.  As we will see, this argument cannot 
save nudges that seek to do something other than promote rational choice be-
cause the opt-out provision will be meaningless for people subject to cognitive 
or motivational biases.  Many nudges are specifically designed to take ad-
vantage of, rather than attempt to alleviate, these biases. 
 
 22. Id. at 729–30 (footnote omitted). 
 23. See id. at 725–29. 
 24. And that the intervention removes important opportunities for learning and 
development.  See generally Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regula-
tion of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006).  I 
return in Part III to the concern that intervening to promote rational choice conflicts 
with libertarian commitments.  See infra Part III. 
 25. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1161 (“The libertarian aspect of our 
strategies lies in the straightforward insistence that, in general, people should be free to 
opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do so.”). 
 26. Id. at 1162. 
 27. Id. at 1165 (“But governments . . . have to provide starting points of one or 
another kind; this is not avoidable.  As we shall emphasize, they do so every day 
through the rules of contract and tort, in a way that inevitably affects some preferences 
and choices.”). 
 28. Id. at 1161. 
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A. Whose Preferences? 
If an intervention moves choosers toward the choices they would make 
were they free of cognitive and motivational biases or leaves them free to 
choose as they see fit (i.e., there is no effort to steer), then the strongest liber-
tarian objections to nudging fall away.  But if an intervention seeks to impose 
on choosers the policymaker’s objective conception of welfare or seeks to pro-
mote the policymaker’s interests over those of the choosers’ will, then the in-
tervention cannot be seen as preserving the liberty of those who are subject to 
the nudge.29 
Many nudges seek to take advantage of aspects of the choice situation to 
steer choosers in particular directions.  For instance, the most popular nudge 
involves setting a default option in a contract or on a government form (such 
as the organ donation question on a driver’s license application30) to the choice 
the nudger prefers, with the hope that many people will stick with the default 
either because the default contains normative information or because of cogni-
tive or motivational inertia.31  The assumption is that many people will fall prey 
to “supposedly irrelevant factors”32 of the choice situation, such as which op-
tion has been set as the default.  By definition, rational actors should not be 
affected by irrelevant features of the environment, but many people fail to be-
have as the ideal rational actor would.33  When the nudger creates policies to 
try to capitalize on irrational tendencies to drive people toward a particular 
outcome, the nudge is choice dependent. 
Although many nudges do favor a particular choice, some nudges do not.  
Some nudges focus on improving the decision-making process itself and are 
agnostic as to the “right” choice to make.  These nudges are choice independ-
ent.34  We can identify at least three types of choice-independent nudges. 
First, many interventions seek only to educate or inform and may be de-
fended on the ground that they promote an individual’s rational choice.  These 
nudges, such as providing consumers with nutritional information or fuel effi-
ciency information, fit squarely within traditional economic approaches to ra-
tional choice, which assume that providing information can do no harm be-
cause individuals will only use the information they deem relevant to their 
choices.  So long as the information is not presented in a way to persuade or 
 
 29. Klick & Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1642. 
 30. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Opting in vs. Opting Out, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, and Future, 106 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1577, 1595 (2016). 
 33. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1168–69. 
 34. Mills discusses three nudges that may help individuals avoid choices contrary 
to their “authentic will” and thus that do not infringe on personal autonomy.  See Mills, 
supra note 11, at 501–02.  I argue that there is a broader range of nudges that can be 
reconciled with personal autonomy, namely, those nudges that I call choice-independ-
ent nudges.  See infra Part II.A. 
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influence choices in any particular direction, then the nudge raises no serious 
libertarian concern.35 
Second, if the nudge only involves reducing “friction” or transaction 
costs, without favoring a particular outcome, then the nudge should likewise 
be unobjectionable.36  Presenting information in a way to make it more com-
prehensible or making it easier to obtain information that a decision-maker 
might desire should promote rather than interfere with free choice. 
Third, nudges that involve decision procedures aimed at encouraging care 
when choosing, or that provide the option to put in place an aid such as e-mail 
reminders that may help one stick with a preferred course of action, should not 
be objectionable from a freedom of choice perspective.37  The most prominent 
example of this type of nudge is active choosing, or requiring that choosers 
acknowledge going through the decision process and prove they have consid-
ered all of the options, such as through use of a comprehension test.38 
These three types of nudges – educative, simplifying, and deliberative – 
should be welcome even to the committed libertarian.  Indeed, it is hard to see 
how reducing unnecessary transaction costs and providing potentially useful 
information and decision aids have anything to do with nudging in any com-
mon-sense use of that term (i.e., nudging implies a directionality that is missing 
here).  If the individual remains free to choose any course of action, with no 
attempt to influence that course, then the choice architect is not imposing her 
will.  Nudging in the direction of rational choice should be consistent with lib-
ertarian self-ownership. 
One might try to save those nudges that go beyond educating, simplifying, 
or encouraging deliberation to steer people toward particular choices – that is, 
the choice-dependent nudges – by arguing that choice-dependent nudges, if 
well designed, should help people make the choices that their rational selves 
 
 35. A stricter position would be that the individuals, and not government, must 
decide what information is needed or desired.  However, to the extent government is 
responding to a perceived need or desire among citizens for a particular type of infor-
mation (e.g., weather forecasting, flight delay information), concerns about “informa-
tional paternalism” should be minimal.  A more serious paternalistic concern arises 
when informational nudges are designed to take advantage of the fears of the public to 
push behavior in particular directions or contain normative information.  See, e.g., Lu-
cia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans Like Nudges?, 11 JUDGMENT & 
DECISION MAKING 310, 314 (2016) (discussing a salt labeling nudge that includes a 
hazardous-to-your-health statement).  These nudges fall into the category of choice-
dependent nudges that pose no concern with respect to rational persons, who should be 
able to ignore them, but they will be paternalistic for irrational persons, who cannot 
resist the fear appeal or dispassionately analyze their own personal risk from the prod-
uct or activity. 
 36. For examples, see Chapter 3 in HALPERN, supra note 8, at 62–79. 
 37. Another example of a commitment nudge is the gambling self-ban, under 
which a person with a gambling problem can register to be banned from casino admis-
sion.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 233. 
 38. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1194. 
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would have made.  But that counterfactual is unknowable,39 and, in any event, 
it is hard to imagine that every rational person would have identical preferences 
and thus make the same choice.40  A fundamental tenet of libertarianism is that 
each individual determines how he or she chooses to live and others must re-
spect those choices so long as they do not infringe on others.41  What looks like 
a mistake from an outsider’s perspective may not be from an insider’s perspec-
tive.42  Just because someone makes a choice that another would not is no rea-
son, within the libertarian framework, for denying that person freedom of 
choice.  Likewise, just because one person makes what looks like a good choice 
given common-sense assumptions, such as more pleasure is good and more 
pain is bad, we cannot assume that others would view this choice as a good 
choice for themselves.43 
It is no response to argue that a nudge steers choosers toward a majoritar-
ian preference.44  First, rarely do nudgers actually seek to determine the major-
ity’s “true” preferences.45  Rather, they usually consult their own intuitions 
about what those preferences are likely to be or impose their own paternalistic 
views about what is best.46  Second, even if data on the majoritarian preference 
is available, libertarianism focuses on the preferences of the individual, not the 
majority: 
A libertarian who wants to respect what the ‘individual really wants’ 
cannot rely on satisfying the ‘average desire of the population’: as the 
 
 39. One may attempt to infer the “true” preferences of inconsistent choosers (i.e., 
those whose choices shift in response to seemingly irrelevant changes in a choice situ-
ation), but one will always be left only with best guesses about what those preferences 
are.  See Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behav-
ioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 260–69 (2015). 
 40. See RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 160 (2012) (“[I]f different individuals ‘truly’ prefer very 
different things, the direction of the nudge cannot coincide with the preferences of all 
the population.”). 
 41. Child, supra note 20, at 726–27. 
 42. See id. at 730–31. 
 43. Pleasure and pain are relative, plus, libertarianism is not hedonism.  Under 
libertarianism, the hedonist and masochist get to make their own respective choices as 
they see fit.  See id. at 726. 
 44. Two suggestions offered to nudgers by Sunstein and Thaler for how to choose 
the direction for the nudge are to look at the choice that most people make over time or 
to somehow determine what the majority would do under conditions of active choosing.  
See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175, 178 (2003). 
 45. See Goldin, supra note 39, at 232–33. 
 46. See id. at 233. 
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respect for individual choices is at the root of libertarianism, it is diffi-
cult to give a precise meaning to the concept of ‘libertarianism on aver-
age’.47 
The fact that many people choose a particular course of action, even under 
conditions that promote rational choice, is no reason to assume all persons 
would rationally make the same choice. 
Where the nudge leaves the nudgee free to make her own choice, then no 
intrusion on self-ownership occurs.  Choice-independent nudges satisfy this 
requirement by nudging only the decision-making process and not the ultimate 
choice.  If choice-dependent nudges ultimately leave choosers free to make 
their own choices, then are these nudges also consistent with self-ownership?  
Why can we not say the nudgee’s preferences ultimately control even where 
the nudger favors one choice over another? 
B. Low-Cost Avoidance? 
Libertarian rescue of choice-dependent nudges through provision of an 
easy opt-out is not successful for two reasons: (a) many interventions now la-
beled nudges allow no opt-out at all; (b) for those choice-dependent nudges 
that do seemingly have an opt-out provision, that provision will not be mean-
ingful for irrational choosers. 
First, many nudges provide no possibility for avoidance.  Indeed, many 
nudges are designed to change the preferences of those covered by the policy, 
often without the conscious awareness of the nudgee.  For instance, all of the 
following have been described as “nudges” even though they aim to change 
preferences or alter the relative cost of options: 
 Requiring movie theaters to use subliminal advertising to discourage 
smoking and overeating48 [attempt to change preferences]; 
 Requiring movie theaters to run public education messages designed 
to discourage smoking and overeating49 [attempt to change prefer-
ences]; 
 Requiring that canteens in public institutions have one meat-free day 
per week50  [changing the option set to favor healthier foods]; 
 Altering people’s affective associations with fruit and vegetables us-
ing implicit priming (i.e., pairing fruits and vegetables with sublimi-
nally presented positive words or images)51 [attempt to change pref-
erences]; 
 
 47. REBONATO, supra note 40, at 160. 
 48. Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 314. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Anneliese Arno & Steve Thomas, The Efficacy of Nudge Theory Strategies in 
Influencing Adult Dietary Behaviour: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 
16 BMC PUB. HEALTH 676, 681 (2016). 
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 Making it more difficult to order unhealthy foods52 [changing acces-
sibility]; 
With these nudges, the nudgee has no choice in the matter and may only 
avoid these nudges by avoiding the situations altogether or by incurring a 
higher price for the disfavored option.  These nudges provide no low-cost 
avoidance option.53 
Second, choice-dependent nudges that are well designed to take ad-
vantage of irrational tendencies will “trick” many people into sticking with the 
nudger’s choice.  Rather than seeking to promote decision-making compe-
tence, as choice-independent nudges do, choice-dependent nudges seek to take 
advantage of cognitive or motivational biases to push people to choices the 
nudger thinks they should make.  With choice-dependent nudges, even when it 
appears that the nudgee remains free to make her own choice, many have only 
the illusion of choice.  With well-designed nudges, the nudger does exactly 
what private companies have long been criticized for doing: manipulating peo-
ple into making the choice the nudger prefers using psychologically-informed 
marketing and choice architecture. 54 
Consider the example of changing the default option to participation in a 
retirement plan from no participation.  That simple change has been found to 
produce much larger rates of participation than requiring active choosing 
whether to participate or not or providing financial education on retirement 
options.55  That increase in participation rates appears primarily to be the prod-
uct of simple acceptance of whatever default is specified.  For at least some 
who stick with the default, the best explanation appears to be that they view 
the default as the status quo and, due to loss aversion, are reluctant to move 
away from it; thus, they will stick with the default, whatever it is.56  To a fully 
rational actor, assuming the benefits of an active choice outweigh the costs of 
deliberation, the specification of the default should be an irrelevant feature of 
the choice setting, but with respect to some persons, this feature appears to be  
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. The basic idea is that the central planner can use nudging for good, in contrast 
to the supposed bad nudging by private companies as they try to manipulate consumer 
choice.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 252 (“One of our main hopes is that 
an understanding of choice architecture, and the power of nudges, will lead others to 
think of creative ways to improve human lives in other domains.”).  For examples of 
companies attempting to use psychology to manipulate consumers, see Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Ma-
nipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000). 
 55. See HALPERN, supra note 8, at 62–64. 
 56. Craig R.M. McKenzie, Michael J. Liersch & Stacey R. Finkelstein, Recom-
mendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 414, 414 (2006) (discussing 
alternative explanations for the “stickiness” of default options, including loss aversion, 
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choice determinative.  For this group of persons, who depart from the rational 
ideal, the availability of an easy way around the default set by the nudger will 
be meaningless. 
Had this group of people been nudged to engage in rational reflection, 
however, we could be much more confident that their choices reflect true pref-
erences.  The fact that those in favor of nudging often reject active choosing 
and financial education by citing evidence of the lower rates of participation 
that follow these choice-independent nudges reveals that the agenda behind 
many nudges is not to improve self-ownership but rather to move people to-
ward the nudger’s conception of the right choice. 
One might argue that we should expect the choices of these initially irra-
tional choosers to become rational over time, and thus so long as the option to 
change courses exist no great harm has been done to self-determination.  That 
is, with enough experience or passage of time, can we not treat failures to opt 
out as evidence of rational, self-determined choices?  In this vein, Sunstein and 
Thaler cite low opt-out rates as one way to evaluate the acceptability of a nudge 
that manipulates default options.57  However, if passive, sustained acceptance 
of a default option signals a true preference, then we should respect the choices 
of the many people who accept a no-participation default for many years and 
thus fail to opt in to retirement plans – yet Sunstein and Thaler see low partic-
ipation rates under the no-participation default as problematic.58  There is no 
principled reason to treat passive acceptance as normatively significant only 
when it favors the path chosen by the nudger.  Thus, absent a theory about 
when passive acceptance does and does not signal “true” preferences, there is 
no justification for treating passive acceptance of the nudged choice as evi-
dence of the choice that would have been rationally made absent the nudge. 
Continued acceptance of a choice may signify a true preference over con-
sidered alternatives, or it may signify nothing more than lassitude, ignorance, 
or gullibility.  When acceptance follows a choice-dependent nudge, instead of 
deliberation prompted by choice-independent nudging, we cannot be confident 
that acceptance signifies a true preference rather than an effective nudge.  
When the nudgee sticks with the nudged choice (as many nudgers hope will 
happen given their views on what would be best for the nudgees), the availa-
bility of an opt-out provision does not alter the paternalistic nature of the 
nudger-nudgee interaction. 
 
 57. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 178–79. (“[T]he libertarian pa-
ternalist might select the approach that minimizes the number of opt-outs.  For example, 
very few employees opt out of the 401(k) plan when they are automatically enrolled, 
though many opt in under the standard enrollment procedure . . . With those numbers, 
there is reason to think that automatic enrollment is better, if only because more people 
are sufficiently satisfied to leave it in place.”). 
 58. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 107–08. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/9
2017] LIBERTARIAN NUDGES 707 
 
III.  CONCLUSION: BETTER THAN SOME ALTERNATIVES 
Choice-independent nudges promote rational choice, leaving each indi-
vidual to determine the choice best for her.  Choice-dependent nudges take 
advantage of irrational tendencies to steer people in particular directions cho-
sen by the nudger.  Some choice-dependent nudges provide no way around the 
nudge (rendering the label “nudge” misleading), but some choice-dependent 
nudges do provide an avoidance option.  When choice-dependent nudges do 
provide a way to avoid the nudger’s preferred choice, that opt-out clause can 
be exercised by rational persons but not by irrational persons if the nudge is 
well designed to capitalize on cognitive or motivational biases.  For the latter 
group, even choice-dependent nudges with opt-out clauses are really just pa-
ternalistic interventions accompanied by the illusion of choice.  We can con-
clude therefore that choice-independent nudges qualify as libertarian nudges 
for all persons, but choice-dependent nudges qualify as libertarian nudges only 
for rational actors (i.e., those who are immune to the psychological biases ex-
ploited by the nudge). 
Choice-independent nudges never involve the imposition of the govern-
ment’s conception of the good onto individuals.  However, the government 
may impose its conception of a good decision-making process with some 
choice-independent nudges.  Active choosing, for instance, forces people to 
deliberate over choices that they might rather not spend any time on, and in this 
way active choosing can be seen as a form of “epistemic paternalism.”59  If 
someone has decided to accept whatever the default is with no deliberation, 
then compelling a more deliberative process does interfere with the original 
plan for choosing.  However, such epistemic paternalism does no harm to the 
ultimate choice that was planned: there is some imposition on process but no 
compulsion on ends. 
And only deliberative nudges raise this epistemic paternalism concern.  
Educative nudges provide information that can be easily ignored, and simpli-
fying nudges reduce transaction costs without compelling any particular pro-
cess.  Therefore, only a small subset of choice-independent nudges raise epis-
temic paternalism concerns. 
For this small subset of choice-independent nudges, there is some mini-
mal intrusion on process, but that intrusion is a small price to pay compared to 
other alternatives government might undertake in an effort to prevent the ex-
ploitation of citizens’ cognitive or motivational weaknesses by more sophisti-
cated bargaining partners.  Indeed, many of the choice-dependent nudges and 
more direct forms of paternalism, such as the banning or mandating of partic-
ular contract terms and prohibitions on fraud and deception in contract, are 
motivated by concerns about exploitation of the psychologically vulnerable by 
the sophisticated, but these interventions go beyond deliberative nudges to im-
pose the nudger’s judgments about welfare onto the nudgee. 
 
 59. Mills, supra note 11, at 504. 
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Child argues persuasively that a fraud prohibition cannot be supported by 
the main propositions of libertarianism,60 but he acknowledges that his argu-
ment depends on individuals having the competence needed to enter into free 
market transactions, namely, the ability to acquire and evaluate information 
and weigh the costs and benefits of different choices.61  “For generally compe-
tent adults, the principle of self-responsibility requires them to use their com-
petence when entering market transactions . . . .  If, while having market com-
petence, one does not pay attention and think through problems which the mar-
ket presents, the principle of self-responsibility bars moral appeal outside one-
self.”62  Therefore, the crucial starting point for libertarianism, and its strong 
respect for an individual’s choices and the complementary reluctance to inter-
vene to redistribute resources when choices go bad, is that individuals have the 
capacity for rational choice.  From that starting point, only the minimal state 
becomes necessary to protect against coercion or theft. 
Within this framework, the epistemic paternalism of nudging toward ra-
tional choice makes other, more intrusive forms of paternalism unnecessary, 
and it enables a strong form of caveat emptor.  A contract accompanied by a 
deliberative nudge should be immune to after-the-fact claims of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, and even fraud.  The use of deliberative nudges 
thus make a fuller commitment to libertarian principles possible, and libertari-
ans should support widespread usage of deliberative nudges for this reason. 
The conclusion that deliberative nudges and other choice-independent 
nudges are “libertarian nudges” should not be terribly surprising.  The domain 
of nudging is now so large that it is said to include the public dissemination of 
large data sets,63 placing energy usage labels on appliances,64 and trying to re-
duce the time and effort needed to understand government regulations and mes-
sages.65  If nudging encompasses any information disclosure that might be of 
use to consumers and includes efforts aimed at reducing transaction costs and 
encouraging deliberation, then many economists and others who give promi-
nence to consumer sovereignty and who seek to promote rational choice have 
been libertarian nudgers for a long time. 
 
 60. Some contend that a prohibition on fraud is one of the market incursions gov-
ernments may make to ensure well-functioning markets, primarily by treating fraud as 
a form of theft.  Child rejects that view and argues that libertarianism requires that a 
strong caveat emptor standard prevail in markets, with only threats of force or theft by 
stealth prohibited.  See Child, supra note 20, at 723–24.  To Child, “theft by stealth” is 
limited to taking of property by someone’s property without awareness or an oppor-
tunity to consider a transaction.  Id. at 732–33.  If one takes the view that “theft by 
stealth” encompasses deception in transactions, then one can justify deliberative nudges 
and even stronger fraud protections on traditional libertarian grounds of property pro-
tection. 
 61. Id. at 729–30. 
 62. Id. at 730. 
 63. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 583. 
 64. Id. 
 65. HALPERN, supra note 8, at 69–76. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/9
